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Articles
A. E. Anton* Legislation and its Limits'
1. Introduction
Political philosophers throughout history have been shocked by the
dictum of Ulpian that "Because it pleases the prince, it has the force
of law",2 and have asked whether there are not moral principles
which a legislator may not contravene, whatever the scope of his
constitutional powers. The philosophers' answers have been of
crucial importance in the development of western legal thought and
have influenced the content both of national constitutions and of
national and international bills of rights. The reasoning, however,
underlying those answers has usually been of an a priori character,
based on the acceptance of theories of natural law which do not
today attract universal acceptance. It is true that, if one probes
beneath the surface of these theories, the ultimate appeal is not
infrequently to the facts of everyday life. 3 Could we not, however,
proceed directly to the underlying question: "Are there practical
constraints which every legislature should in its own interests
recognise, even when no legal limitations appear to affect it?"
This may be, strictly speaking, neither a legal nor a philosophical
question, but it was touched upon by Dr. Horace E. Read in his
Cases and other Materials on Legislation.4 It is of perennial interest
to those concerned with legislation and is, I suspect, as old as
legislation itself. It must have given pause to the intelligent tyrants
of history, as it certainly did to those who, like Machiavelli,
analysed their political powers and strategies.
That eminent Victorian, Leslie Stephen, suggested that there
were distinct limits to legislative power, because "the power of
imposing laws is dependent upon the instinct of subordination,
*A. E. Anton, C.B.E., F.B.A., Commissioner, the Scottish Law Commission,
formerly Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Glasgow.
1. The Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture, delivered in Dalhousie Law School on
25th September 1978 by the author.
2. "Sed et quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem . Justinian, Institutes,
1.2.6, attributed to Ulpian in Digest, 1.4.1
3. Cf. J. Bentham,A Fragment of Government, ed. W. Harrison (Oxford, 1960) at
92
4. (2nd. ed. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1959) at 75
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which is itself very limited". 5 Stephen suggested that the limits to
legislative power were both external - relating to the attitudes of
the people - and internal - being conditioned by the social
background of the legislators. Dicey, in commenting on this, argued
that this distinction must virtually dissolve in a society enjoying
representative Government. 6 This comfortable suggestion may have
had some basis in 19th century England, when the common ground
of political parties was far more significant than their areas of
controversy and when there was virtually a constitutional
convention not to pass "any laws which any substantial section of
the population violently dislikes". 7 It certainly has little basis in the
United Kingdom today, when relatively narrow political majorities
in turn proclaim themselves to be the authentic voice of the people
and enact laws which may be violently disliked by substantial
sections of the population.
Legal and political philosophers today would no doubt agree with
Stephen that a distinction should be drawn between the external and
the internal limits to legislative power. They would be likely,
however, to define the internal limits in a somewhat different way,
and to regard them as being set by the constitutional structure of the
legal system and, ultimately, by the grundnorm or rules of
recognition which support that constitutional structure. It is
arguable, however, that also in this sense there is a clear
relationship between the external and the internal limits of
legislative power.
8
Leslie Stephen suggested that man's instinct of subordination is
very limited. Do we not, on the contrary, have a healthy instinct of
insubordination, which is checked only by self-interest? It may be
that, as Bentham9 and, still more clearly, Austin' ° appreciated, our
interests are rarely on the side of rebellion, but the interest of those
who govern lies equally clearly in avoiding the creation of
conditions favourable to rebellion." The head that wears the crown
5. Leslie Stephen, The Science of Ethics (London, 1882) at 143
6. Law of the Constitution (9th ed. London: MacMillan & Co., 1952) at 82-83
7. Cf. R. Y. Jennings, Law and the Constitution (5th ed.) at 148
8. F. A. Hayek has expressed the same thought: ". . . but power to legislate
presupposes the recognition of some common rules; and such rules which underlie
the power to legislate may also limit that power." Law, Legislation and Liberty
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Vol. 1, 1973) at 95
9. See, supra, note 3 at 55
10. J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. H.L.A. Hart
(London, 1954) at 53
II. Cf. Hobbes' remark . and governing to the profit of the subjects is
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will lie uneasily unless it can obtain, if not the support, then at least
the acquiescence of the majority of the people. If a crowned head
were to say, like Charles Fox, "I pay no regard whatever to the
voice of the people",12 and were to decree the slaughter of
blue-eyed babies 13 or the wicked withdrawal of free school milk, he
might well suffer a fate worse than the indignity suffered by Fox of
being attacked by the mob and rolled in the mud.
It is a familiar lesson of history that obedience to the law and,
therefore, the retention of political authority can seldom be taken for
granted and that, in societies other than the most brutal tyrannies,
such obedience depends less on the policeman, with or without a
gun, than on the maintenance of a general - if in particular respects
qualified - acceptance of the authority of the law. There is a clear
relationship, that is, between the internal and the external limits of
the law. Machiavelli saw this and there are passages in his writings
to which he instructs the princes of his time how to preserve their
powers by observing the principle of moderation in legislation.
1 4
Can we give similar advice to the Parliamentary princes of today?
How can they best maintain respect for the authority of the law?
Physical laws of nature
The trite remark that Parliament may do anything except turn black
into white or a man into a woman carries the implication that there
are practical limits to legislative power set by the physical laws of
nature. Though perhaps even Dicey on reflection would have
admitted this to be self-evident, it is a truism which less
sophisticated persons may overlook. When Parliament, at the
instance of My Lords Chesterfield and Macclesfield substituted the
Gregorian for the Julian calendar, and declared that the day after
2nd September 1752 was to be reckoned the 14th, an omission of 11
days, "Polite society", in the words of a historian 15 - "readily
governing to the profit of the sovereign", in F. Tdnnies, ed., The Elements of Law,
Part II, ch. 9,para. I (London, 1928)
12. Cecil S. Emden, The People and the Constitution (2nd. ed. London: Oxford
University Press, 1956) at 53
13. See, supra, note 5 at 143
14. See, for example, Nicholas Machiavelli, Works ... in English (London,
1680) at 284 "Those princes and commonwealth who would keep their
Government active and uncorrupt, are above all things to have a care of religion
and its ceremonies, and preserve them in due veneration in the whole world. There
is not a greater sign of imminent ruine than when God and his Worship are
despised."
15. I.S. Leadam, Political History of England, Vol. 9 (London, 1909) at 423
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accepted a reform introduced under such auspices; but the pious
shuddered at the profanity of tampering with saints' days and the
commonalty grudged that their lives should be shortened by Acts of
Parliament." Matters come to a more serious pass, however, when
legislators themselves forget that they are men, and cannot change
the laws of nature. When they do so, however, the judges may
amiably come to Parliament's rescue by presuming that it was not
Parliament's real intention to defy the laws of nature. In Keogh v.
Magistrates of Edinburgh, 16 it was argued that Parliament had
imposed on the magistrates of that windy city an absolute duty to
keep the gas street lamps turned on throughout the hours of
darkness, but Lord Sands remarked: "Great as are the powers of the
legislature, it can control and give directions to persons only, and
not to things. It can say to the Corporation 'Light', but it cannot say
to the material universe 'Let there be light'. It appears to me
reasonable to hold that the legislature recognises that similar
limitations attach to the Corporation of Edinburgh, and that, in
directing that the Corporation shall light the streets, the legislature
recognises that even the Corporation are but men." 1
7
In a juridical sense, apart from treaty obligations and apart from
constitutional limitations in federal and quasi-federal States, the
legislature may seem capable of doing what it pleases. It may deem
an adopted child to be the child of its adopting parents, and not that
of its natural parents, in any situations whatever. In a practical
sense, however, the legislature must have regard to the laws of
nature and, even where in general it deems an adopted child to be
the child of its adopting parents, it will have regard to the natural
relationship in limiting cases such as capacity to marry. 18 Scots law
in the past ignored illegitimate relationships, not only in the law of
succession but even in the rules prescribing the prohibited degrees
of marriage. 19 But it has been found necessary to change all this.
20
In many situations the law can ignore the physical laws of nature
only at the risk of seeming ridiculous to the public, and so rules of
16. [1926] S.L.T. 527.
17. Id. at 531
18. Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s.2 and Sch. I.
19. Philp's Trustees v. Beaton, [1938] S.C. 733
20. As to succession, see the Report of the Scottish Law Commission on the
Reform of the Law Relating to Legitimation per subsequens matrimonium, (1967;
Cmd. 3223) the Legitimation (Scotland) Act 1968 and the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1968, s.5. As to marriage, see the
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s. 2 and Sch. I
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law prescribing the duration of the period of conception and the
limits of a woman's capacity to conceive have been gradually
modified to take account of advances in medical knowledge. At
present the Scottish Law Commission is examining, in the light of
medical and other evidence, the law relating to incest where, even
to this day, Scots law draws its prohibitions from Leviticus. Chapter
XVIII. Currently, in various legal systems, legal definitions of life
and of death are in process of reformulation in the light of recent
advances in medical science and technology.
The risk remains, however, that the legislature, in seeking to
adapt the law to fashionable ideology, may ignore the facts of nature
or of life. The Scottish Police Federation recently attacked the
provisions of the United Kingdom Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in
so far as they apply to the recruitment to the police. 21 As their
spokesman said of women: "They have their limits. God made us
differently and an Act of Parliament cannot change that." Here, as
elsewhere, the judges endeavour to inject commonsense into the
law.
"El Vino" is a pub in Fleet Street at the heart of the English
newspaper industry and a lady journalist recently complained to the
court that the publican would serve only men at his bar, and
required her to sit at an adjacent table. Though it might have been
thought that this amounted to discrimination in the provision of
goods, facilities or services contrary to section 29(1) (b) of the 1975
Act, the County Court judge would have none of this, and said that
the Act should not be interpreted in a legalistic vacuum but in a
commonsense way by reference to its object, which was to promote
harmony between the sexes. The publican, he held, had clearly
introduced his rule through motives of chivalry. Again, on 28 July
1978, the Court of Appeal in England had to decide the important
question whether the Act entitled a girl of 12 to play football for her
local football team. Lord Denning, though he was otherwise on firm
ground in terms of section 44 of the Act, suggested that the law
would be "an ass and an idiot" if it tried to make girls into boys so
they could join in all boys' games.
Nature of a legal system
The judge in the El Vino case remarked that the Sex
Discrimination Act should not be interpreted in a legalistic way. We
21. Scotsman, April 27, 1978
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are often impatient with legalistic interpretations of statute law: "If
only", we may say, "the judges would more often forget about the
rules, and rely more on their commonsense and sense of justice".
But it must be remembered that legal rights, including our rights to
property, our rights to reputation, our rights not to be injured or
discriminated against, will be found on analysis to be no more than
conclusions which are drawn from the existence of legal rules.
22
The paradox is that without rules, and without their fair application
in particular cases, there can be no freedom. This points to another
limit to the power of a legislature, perhaps a limit intrinsic to the
nature of a legal system.
The essence of a legal system is that it is a rule-applying rather
than an equity-dispensing system. The layman may be perturbed,
and even may profess to be shocked, by particular applications of
rules of law, but a legal system must seek less to maximise the
happiness of individuals in particular cases than to find and to apply
rules which, if applied generally, would maximise happiness in the
community. In other words, a legal system is a species of
rule-utilitarianism in action. Wasserstrom, in The Judicial
Decision,23 points out that the foreclosure of a mortgage may
occasion hardship and distress to a widowed farmer and her six
children but, if the legislature or the courts were to look simply to
the interests of the particular parties concerned and to refuse
foreclosure in cases of hardship, the system of borrowing money on
the security of property would become commercially unattractive
and in this way greater hardship might be occasioned to poor
farmers as a class. Analogous problems are currently facing the
Scottish Law Commission in its examination of the law relating to
the enforcement of court decrees. Similar problems, indeed,
underlie every attempt to reform the law, and they are all the more
difficult to resolve because the competing policies may be difficult
to identify and evaluate.
Another constraint arises, as the Marxist philosopher Frederick
Engels, pointed out, because of the need to maintain consistency in
the law: "The law", he said, 24 "must not only correspond to the
general economic condition and to its expression, but must also be
22. H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence (1954), 70 L.Q.R. 37 at
47-49
23. (Stanford, 1961)at 140-142
24. Selected Works (London, 1968) at 686. 1 owe this reference to Alan Watson,
Society and Legal Change (Edinburgh, 1977) at 7
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an internally coherent expression which does not, owing to inner
contradictions, reduce itself to naught. And in order to achieve this
the faithful reflection of economic conditions suffers increasingly".
If legislation were merely a profusion of rules of singular
application, glaring anomalies and absurdities would be inevitable.
There would still be unforeseen cases and, because the rules would
be likely to lack inner consistency, the gaps could not be filled by
the normal processes of induction and analogy. 25 The lawyer's call
for the inner consistency of the law is not motivated simply by his
desire for juristic elegance but by his insistence that the legislature
must create the necessary conditions for the juristic development of
the law. The lawyer will freely concede that the demand for
consistency may cause hardship in some cases but he will claim,
and I think with reason, that in the end this consistency permits the
legal system more effectually to do justice in the vast majority of
cases.
Lack of coherence in the law may arise because responsibility for
separate branches of the law may be allocated to separate
Departments of State, and each, in seeking to give its own policies
immediate legislative effect, may tend to ignore the long-term
implications of these policies in other branches of the law. The
consequences were graphically stated by a Scottish commentator in
1873:
But your departmental prepared Code stands out of all relations.
Each separate doctrine is but the cold and frigid dictum of the
despotic power which made it. Each doctrine is, so to speak sui
juris, acting independently of all its neighbours. As soon hope
that chaos would not return again if the planets were allowed to
go at large through space, as that a law so framed may be
otherwise than productive of mischief and confusion .26
This problem is exacerbated in legal systems which are parts of a
federal or devolutionary constitutional structure because attempts
may be made to extend the rules of one system into another where
they simply do not fit. In the United Kingdom, around the 1850s,
English Chambers of Commerce became impatient of the
distinctions between the commercial laws of England and Scotland,
because those distinctions might constitute a trap for the unwary. In
consequence, the Mercantile Law Amendment Acts of 1856 were
25. See A. Tune, The Grand Outlines of the Code Napoleon (1955), 29 Tulane
Law Review 431 at 441
26. (1873), 17 Journal of Jurisprudence I at 6
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passed. Their preambles say that they were to remedy "the
inconvenience felt by persons engaged in trade, by reason of the
laws of Scotland being in some particulars different from those of
England and Ireland in matters of common occurrence". The Acts
introduced a few Scottish rules into English law but on the whole
the principles which they adopted were principles of English law. A
contemporary Scottish commentator remarked:
This is not the time, were it the place, to question the policy of
the measure; but aware as we are of the danger of voluntarily
engrafting a rule, the growth of another law, on a system foreign
to it in principle and practice, we shall certainly watch this
operation with some degree of anxiety . . . . our judges will
have to solve the novel problem of reconciling principles flowing
from one source with others from a directly opposite.
27
These prophetic words were amply justified by events and the next
century presented the spectacle of the Scottish judges attempting
with indifferent success to marry the ale of English law with the
whisky of Scots law, an undistilled with a distilled product. 28
The Scotland Act 1978 provides for the setting up of a Scottish
Assembly and for the devolution to it of certain legislative powers.
In a Memorandum 29 to Government on the Implications of
Devolution, the Scottish Law Commission argued as follows:
"There would be a risk of loss of functional efficiency if there were
a division of legislative authority in important areas of private law.
We have explained above that the private law of a country is not an
assemblage of largely independent acts or rules, but a single and
integrated piece of machinery whose component parts must fit in
with one another and serve the needs of the machine as a whole. To
divide legislative authority for parts of the machine will certainly
reduce its efficiency and utility." The problem, indeed, is one
which affects any minority legal system, and it is interesting to
27. (1857), 1 Journal ofJurisprudence 13
28. See, for example, McBain v. Wallace & Co. (1880-81), 18 S. L. Rep. 227
(H.L.); see also McCowan v. Wright (1851-52), 24 S.J. 575 per L.J.C. Hope at
576. An unhappy attempt to assimilate the Scottish and English legal systems may
be found in s.2 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. This declares that capacity to buy
and sell is regulated by the general law of capacity to contract, but adds the proviso
that 'where neccessaries are sold and delivered to an infant or minor . . . he must
pay a reasonable price therefor'. This merely confuses the law of Scotland where
minors have capacity to contract, subject only to reduction on the ground of lesion.
Section 2 says nothing on the other hand about the position of pupils who have no
capacity to contract.
29. Memorandum No. 32, para. 17, p. 6 3
Legislation and its Limits 241
notice that it is now being encountered in England in the context of
legislation emanating from the European Communities. Recently, a
Select Committee of the House of Lords in a Report3 0 on the
"Approximation of Laws under Article 100 of the EEC Treaty"
found it necessary to emphasize that "A national system of law
should be regarded as a coherent whole, and there is a danger that
sporadic incursions into it will affect its structure; a real need ought
therefore to be shown before approximation is embarked upon". 3
Practical constraints affecting legislative power spring less often
from the physical laws of nature, or from the nature of a legal
system, than from limitations on available resources, problems of
communication, the limited effectiveness of sanctions, and the
social attitudes of men.
Limitations on resources
Little need be said about limitations on resources. It is obvious
that nearly every legislative intervention involves costs for the State
or for the parties concerned. Parliament may decide, as it did in the
Moneylenders Acts, to intervene merely to prevent flagrant abuses
of economic power but, once legislation has been enacted, a
Department of State will be asked to supervise the operation of the
Act, and may well tend to expand the range of its controls. This
happened recently in the same area in the United Kingdom under the
Consumer Credit Act 1974. Since the matters with which it deals
are far removed from the public order, and the ordinary law
enforcement agencies would be unlikely to intervene with
appropriate zest, a special enforcement agency, the Director of Fair
Trading, was given new and extensive powers. Even the Act itself,
complicated though it may appear to be, turns out on analysis to be
little more than a skeleton to be clothed with flesh by statutory
instruments creating a system of Licensing and further controls. We
have today innumerable governmental agencies of one sort or
another, from the Health and Safety Commission to the Race
Relations Board. The growing importance of these institutions has
received attention only from specialists in the particular fields. The
general problem is that certain social policies may be given legal
effect only by the provision of appropriate institutional support
3 2
30. Dated April 18, 1978, H.L. (1977-78) 131
31. Id. at 15
32. Adam Podgorecki, Law and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974)
at 254
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and there is in consequence a gradual intrusion of public law into the
private sector, with possible damage to the coherence of the system
of private law. It is not clear that the consequences of this
transformation are fully appreciated or that those who originally
sought to extrapolate the particular policies always took full account
of the financial and other costs.
In Bills presented to the United Kingdom Parliament, there is
always attached an "Explanatory and Financial Memorandum"
which explains the financial effects of the Bill upon the public
purse. This Memorandum, however, will totally ignore the financial
and manpower implications of the proposed legislation for
commerce and industry, and for society as a whole. The financial
implications for commerce may be burdensome and the manpower
implications, particularly for higher management, extremely
serious. Their problems are not alleviated by the complexity of
much modem legislation, and its pedantic concern for the trivial.
Problems of communication
One important, though today all too neglected, practical limit to
legislation is imposed by the limited capacity of the public to digest
it. Viscount Stair, who might be described as the founder of modern
Scots law, writing in 1681 when our statute law was both simple in
its expression and trifling in its volume, remarked that written laws
tended to "increase to such a mass, that they cease to be evidences
and securities to people, and become labyrinths, wherein they are
fair to lose their rights, if not themselves". 33 There is a tendency in
modem legislative drafting to seek to anticipate every possible
situation and to state each rule with every appropriate qualification.
The result may seem perfection itself to the draftsman or specialist,
but it may puzzle the ordinary solicitor and be quite incomprehensi-
ble to the man in the street. If it is to the latter that modern social
legislation is directed, can it function effectively if it cannot be
understood by him?3 4
Only too often the man in the street, in Bentham's phrase, is
"unconscious with respect to the law". 3 5 He cannot be expected to
consult it in his daily life and, in consequence, has to be content to
apply fashionable legal superstitions. I suspect that these have a
33. Institutions (3rd. ed.) at 10
34. See Jane Fortin, [1978] New L.J. 700 at 702
35. See, supra, note 3 at 45
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more pervasive influence on social and business conduct than the
law itself.3 6 What I am suggesting is that life and the law have a
habit of not intersecting until some family or business crisis arises.
Then the law may intervene, and the conduct of the persons
concerned is analysed ex postea within what to them may be a new
and artificial legal framework. If this is so, and I believe it to be
so,3 7 the legislature will occasion hardship and even injustice if
rules of law are not stated in an intelligible and accessible form.
This is true even of statements of the rules of criminal law. I suggest
that the real need is not - as is the current fashion in England today
- to aim for a precision in the drafting of offences which would not
discredit a taxing statute but rather to ensure that penal legislation
- drafted with however broad a brush - conforms by and large to
reasonable standards of moral achievement. This is important
because, as suggested above, obedience to the law depends in the
final analysis upon the maintenance of a general - if in particulars
qualified - acceptance of the authority of the law.
I am not arguing that any and every departure from the law is a
threat to the legal system. If that were so, there would be little hope
for society. The breaking of laws relating to Sunday Observance or
even to the parking of motor vehicles would be a threat to the social
structure. While this extreme position would be widely rejected,
disobedience to the law on any substantial scale is an infection
difficult to quarantine and it seems best to design the law as to
maximise potential compliance.
Limited Effectiveness of sanctions
Sanctions have their own inherent limitations. Idealists who wish to
fashion the conduct of others by applying the canons of their own
critical morality are liable to forget that in some important areas of
conduct no legal machinery is likely to secure the desired result. A
decree of restitution of conjugal rights is unlikely to rekindle the
embers of dying love. The law can often punish us for being bad,
but can less frequently make us good. The impotence of the law to
secure the desired result lies behind such rules as the rule that the
courts will not specifically enforce promises to marry or indeed any
36. Cf. Edwin M. Shur, Law and Society (New York, 1968) at 129-131; and Sir
Maurice Amos, Should we Codify the Law (1933), 4 Political Quarterly 317 at 364
37. Cf. Royal Commission on Civil Liability (Pearson Commission) (1978; Cmd.
7054) at 62, para. 250
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contract, such as a contract of service or a contract of partnership,
which involves a close personal relationship between the contract-
ing parties. 38 In those cases, forced compliance would be worse
than none and the remedy of the other party is merely one for
damages.
The effectiveness of the criminal law is obviously limited in some
cases because of the practical difficulties in identifying and catching
the culprit. It is increasingly recognised today that the severity of
sanctions is less likely to constitute an effective deterrent than the
certainty of their incidence. 39 And there are many activities which
may be carried on well out of reach of the agencies of law
enforcement. The United Kingdom customs and excise authorities
have now given up the onerous task of policing the home-brewing
of beer, but there are other activities equally difficult to detect
which the law still classifies as offences. Here the legislature should
remember that the detection and punishment of breaches of the law
involves the use of scarce and expensive legal resources, including
those of the police, prosecutors, defending counsel (who may now
be paid by the State), courts, prison authorities, and social, welfare
and aftercare authorities. The dangers of the legislature declaring
criminal everything which it dislikes have been trenchantly
delineated by a representative of the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation: "The result is that the criminal code becomes
society's trash bin. The police have to rummage around in this
material and are expected to prevent everything that is unlawful.
They cannot do so because many of the things prohibited are simply
beyond enforcement, both because of human inability to enforce the
law and because, as in the case of prohibition, society legislates one
way and acts another way. 40 Punishment prima facie is an evil and
the mere fact that it is imposed by state authority is not necessarily a
justification for it. The benefits which rules of law seek to ensure
must always be weighed against the disadvantages which may be
associated with their enforcement. 41
38. Macarthur v. Lawson (1877), 4 R. 1134 at 1136; Skerrat v. Oliver (1896), 23
R. 468. Cf. Murray v. Dumbarton C.C., [ 1935] S.L.T. 239
39. Erherd Blakenburg, The Selectivity of Legal Sanctions (1976), 11 Law and
Society Review 109
40. Cited by J. H. Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: A Sociological Discussion of the
Enforcement of Morals (Berkeley: University of Calif., 1967), submitted to The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
41. A. M. Rose, Sociological factors in the Effectiveness of Projected Legal
Remedies (1959), 11 J. of Legal Education 470
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A most interesting discussion of this general problem is contained
in the Report of a United Kingdom Departmental Committee on
Human Artificial Insemination. 42 The Committee were clear in their
opinion "that having regard to the dangers and disadvantages for
the child, the parents, the donor, and for society as a whole, A.I.D.
is undesirable. We, therefore, wish (6 discourage the practice." But
they pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to detect. It
could be easily concealed and, if it became criminal, would be even
more carefully concealed. The Committee concluded, therefore,
that "to attempt to prohibit by law a practice which is very difficult
to detect, which is so far of very small extent and not demonstrably
harmful to the community as a whole, which, if prohibited, might
get into worse hands or offer scope for blackmail and which some
people do not regard as morally wrong would, we think, be liable to
encourage a general disrespect for the criminal law".
43
These arguments may be applied with certain changes of
emphasis to current controversies in other fields, for example, that
of abortion. The principal difference is that abortion is widely felt to
be gravely immoral. Those, however, who wish to repeal the
Abortion Act tend to forget that, though it might be relatively easy to
prevent abortions being conducted in State hospitals, the demand
for them on the part of the girls involved is so inelastic that they are
willing to pay almost any price and to go to almost any place to
obtain one. Abortions by qualified persons would become
extremely expensive, abortions by unqualified persons would be
resumed, and the women exposed to all the risks of unskilled
treatment. The law would be enforced with difficulty and with
reluctance on the part of police and prosecutors. Judges and juries
would be reluctant to convict. 44 In consequence, the law would
often be broken with impunity, and to that extent the law would fall
into disrepute.
Simple and obvious though these considerations may be, they are
often, to use the language of Austin, "overlooked by legislators. If
they fancy a practice pernicious, or hate it they know not why, they
proceed without further thought to forbid it by positive law. They
forget that positive law may be superfluous or impotent, and
42. (1860; Cmd. 1105) at para. 264
43. Id. at para. 2.39
44. The refusal of juries to convict in dangerous driving cases in the United
Kingdom is notorious. They took the same attitude to the Cromwellian offence of
adultery. See J. W. Davies, The Early Stuarts (Oxford, 1937) at 302
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therefore may lead to nothing but purely gratuitous vexation. They
forget that the moral or religious sentiments of the community may
already suppress the practice as completely as it can be
suppressed".
45
Can legislation change social attitudes?
My general conclusion is that legislation has little chance of success
if it demands unreasonable standards of moral attainment.4 6 This,
however, is not to suggest that the law can do nothing more than
reflect current social attitudes and canons of behaviour and is
wholly powerless to change them. This pessimistic view of the
power of legislation was characteristic of lawyers and of
sociologists in the 19th century. Sir Frederick Pollock pointed out
that the law could punish stealing but not covetousness and argued
that, because the law could not know or control the thoughts and
conscience of the individual, "The law does not aim at perfecting
the individual character of man, but at regulating the relations of
citizens to the commonwealth and to one another". 47 It does not
follow, however, that, because the effective intervention of the law
is limited to overt acts, the law cannot aim indirectly towards
perfecting man's character. The lawyers of Pollock's time were
apparently influenced by the pessimistic view taken by contempor-
ary sociologists, such as Ehrlich and Sumner, of the power of the
law to modify or change the folkways of society. 48 They said that
the law cannot alter prejudices which are deep-seated in the minds
of men, and even that the law's intrusion might serve to harden
these prejudices. Because of this, some of them argued that it might
be counterproductive for the law to intervene to shield those subject
to racial discrimination in the typical fields of employment, housing
and education. These views had great influence on judges in the
United States. 49 This pessimism is odd, since the 19th century itself
45. See, supra, note 10 at 162
46. See Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1969) at 262
47. Justice According to the Law (1875), 9 Harvard L. R. 295 at 303
48. See in particular, Sumner, Folkways (New York: Mentor Books, 1960) at 89;
and (1962), 67 American Journal of Sociology at 532-540
49. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537, per Mr. Justice H. B. Brown at
p. 551: "The argument [of the plaintiff] also assumes that social prejudices may be
overcome by legislation and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except
by an enforced co-mingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If
the two races are to meet on terms of social equality it must be the result of natural
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witnessed striking changes of attitude, in part at least, attributable to
the effects of the social legislation of the period.50 More recently, in
the field of race relations, legislation in the United States and in the
United Kingdom has tended to create a more prevalent acceptance
of racial equality and, from the point of view of the racially
disadvantaged, to reduce their sense of injustice. 5 1 It need not be
suggested that rules of law are more than one catalyst in the process
of forming public opinion, but their existence on the statute book
may help to impress upon individuals the attitude of society to
certain forms of conduct. In some cases, indeed, when it has the
support of informed public opinion, legislation may achieve
gradual, but in time striking, success in changing the customs and
attitudes of society.
52
Moderation in recourse to legislation
It may be conceded, however, that there are distinct limits to the
law's practical ability to change social attitudes and customs,
especially where related to man's physical or psychological needs.
Bentham asked, though in a slightly different context,
With what chance of success, for example, would a legislator
go about to extirpate drunkenness and fornication by dint of legal
affinities, a mutual appreciation of each others' merits and a voluntary consent of
individuals."
50. A. V. Dicey, who analysed the reciprocal influences of the law and public
opinion in England during this period remarked:
"Every law or rule of conduct must, whether its author perceives the fact or not,
lay down or rest upon some general principle and must, therefore, if it succeeds
in attaining its end, commend this principle to public attention or imitation, and
thus affect legislative opinion" - Law and Public Opinion (2nd. ed. London:
MacMillan & Co., 1962) at 41
51. Morroe Berger, Equality by Statute (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967);
John P. Roche and Milton M. Gordon, "Can Morality be Legislated?" Cited in
Charles G. Howard and Robert S. Sumners, Law, Its Nature, Functions and Limits
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) at 439; J. R. Pennock and J. W.
Chapman, eds., The Limits of the Law: Nomos XV (New York: Lieber-Atherton,
1974) at 1-2; A. M. Rose (1959), 11. J. of Legal Education 470; Edwin M. Shur,
Law and Society (New York, 1968) at 135-139; Davis McEntire, "The Efficacy of
the Law in Inter-Group Relations" in Residence and Race (Berkeley, 1960) set out
in Grossman and Grossman at 268-280
52. Cf. L. S. Robertson, An Instance of Effective Legal Regulation (1967), 10 Law
and Society Rev. 467. In 17th century England, the attempt was made to proscribe
duelling by law: "This legislation was fairly successful, for public opinion
supported it, and a jury did not hesitate to convict a duellist" - J. G. Davies, The
Early Stuarts (Oxford, 1938) at 302. The author contrasts the failure of the attempts
to proscribe adultery.
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punishment? Not all the tortures which ingenuity could invent
would compass it: and, before he had made any progress worth
regarding, such a mass of evil would be produced by the
punishment, as would exceed, a thousand-fold, the possible
mischief of the offence. 
53
Unfortunately, this singular prophet has been ignored, and not only
in his own country. But, to take one illustration only, the failure of
the United States National Prohibition Act is a striking testimony to
the soundness of his predictions. Since systematic and notorious
inobservance of the law may undermine public respect for it,
legislators frustrate those wants and desires at their peril.
The law is a weapon of such power and effectiveness when
properly deployed that society is always tempted to use the law too
freely. Legislators often place on the criminal law burdens more
suitably borne by churches, schools and, dare it be said, by parents
and neighbours. Even in matters of civil law legislators tend to
forget that life is always more complex than we suppose and that
every disturbance of traditional legal relationships risks producing
unpredicted and unwelcome remote affects.
The law is a weapon whose steel may be blunted by clumsy use
against inappropriate targets, and it would seem better to keep it
sharp for these targets which it has a reasonable chance of striking:
"Multiply the laws", said a Roman jurist, "and you will multiply
lawyers and criminals". Though I take some exception to that
juxtaposition, I am prepared to admit - or even assert - that if you
multiply the laws then you multiply the chances of their being
unknown and disregarded in practice. You multiply also the chances
of their being harsh when applied, and you sensibly diminish man's
freedom of choice of action. In the words of Thomas Hobbes: ". .
the greatest liberty of the subject dependeth on the silence of the
law". 5 4
53. W. Harrison, ed., Principles ofMorals and Legislation (Oxford, 1960) at 420
54. Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) at 143
